Interactive Constitution Essay: Fugitive Slave Clause

The third clause of Article IV, Section 2 is known as the “Fugitive Slave Clause.” It is one of five clauses in the Constitution that dealt directly with slavery, although it does not use the word “slave,” and instead refers to “person[s] held to Service or Labour.” Compared to the Slave Trade Clause and the Three-Fifths Clause, the Fugitive Slave Clause occasioned very little debate at the time it was adopted, but fierce conflicts arose about its scope and enforcement in the decades that followed. The Clause was adopted at the Constitutional Convention of 1787 on the motion of Pierce Butler and Charles Pinckney of South Carolina. In opposition, James Wilson of Pennsylvania disagreed because “this would oblige the Executive of the State to [return fugitive slaves], at the public expence.” The proposal was withdrawn, but then adopted a day later with no dispute. The only response recorded was Connecticut delegate Roger Sherman’s sarcastic comment that he “saw no more propriety in the public seizing and surrendering a slave or servant, than a horse.”

Over the course of the Constitutional Convention issues relating to slavery complicated nearly every debate and the importance of slavery became increasingly evident. In the Convention’s final actions on slavery-related matters, the language of the Fugitive Slave Clause was discussed and amended. The Committee of Detail reported the language “No person legally held to service or labour in one state escaping into another shall . . . be discharged from such service or labour . . . .” The Convention substituted the term “under the laws thereof” after the word “state” for the term “legally.” The delegates made this change to satisfy those who sought to distance themselves from the institution of slavery and make clear that it was a local institution only in certain states. This was a small triumph for those who were uneasy about slavery, but it had no practical effect.

At the end of the day, since the word “slavery” was never mentioned in the document, northerners could argue that the Constitution did not recognize the legality of slavery. However, southerners such as General Cotesworth Pinckney argued, “We have obtained a right to recover our slaves in whatever part of America they may take refuge, which is a right we had not before.” Ultimately, the issue of slavery’s constitutional status was far from settled.

Like the other two Clauses, the Fugitive Slave Clause did not provide for any particular enforcement powers. Congress passed the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793, with almost no opposition or debate, to provide for enforcement. The Act authorized a slaveowner or his agents to cross a state line, seize an alleged fugitive slave, take the slave before any judge or local magistrate, and there, upon proof of ownership, receive a certificate entitling him to return home with his captive.

Financial penalties could result for interfering with the recovery of a fugitive. The law’s evidentiary requirements were loose and oral testimony was sufficient; it did not provide for normal legal processes like trial by jury. It gave the alleged fugitive no protection against self-incrimination and no assurance that he could testify on his own behalf. It also did not specify a time limitation, so slaves could be claimed many years after the alleged escape.